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BACKGROUND AND APPRECIATION OF THE YALTA TALKS

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APPRAISAL OF THE TITO-KHRUSHCHEV TALKS

1. Why the meeting took place.

- a. Moscow has been alarmed by recent events, especially in Poland and Hungary, which appear to threaten Soviet control of the satellites and even the stability of the satellite Communist regimes. These undesirable aspects of liberalization stem in part from the Titoist example. Therefore, Moscow has determined to revoke its blessing of Titoism insofar as it encourages independent satellites. Evidence of this determination is the secret directive issued 3 September by the Central Committee of the CPSU, warning the satellites against emulating Yugoslav Communism. Khrushchev may have come to Belgrade prepared to hand Tito an ultimatum enforcing this warning. More probably he intended to "explain" the secret directive and to seek Tito's cooperation in restraining satellite tendencies to factionalism and independence of Moscow.
- b. Reinforcing the urgency of the satellite problem was the realization on both sides that the respective power positions of the USSR and Yugoslavia were involved. Conflicting Moscow and Belgrade views of how the satellites should evolve were apparently but not actually resolved by earlier mutual declarations acknowledging "different roads to Socialism" and "equality" (i.e. independence) of Communist Parties.
 - (1) Moscow still aims at a Communist bloc directed from Moscow. Such a bloc can exert coordinated pressure against Tito.
 - (2) Tito wants to avoid just such coordinated pressure by encouraging satellite regimes independent of Moscow. But he wants these regimes to be strong and stable, because a weakened Communist structure would lay his own regime open to undesirable Western pressures.

- c. There is little evidence to confirm reports that Khrushchev was speaking Tito's help against opposition Stalinists within the Presidium of the USSR. These reports may have been encouraged by the Yugoslavs as a sop to US opinion.

2. What Tito and Khrushchev discussed.

- a. The weight of evidence and logic suggests that Tito and Khrushchev were primarily concerned with the scope and pace of liberalization in the satellites, and with the character and stability of the satellite Communist regimes. The discussion probably turned on the problem of how far the satellites should be permitted to go in emulating Tito's Yugoslavia. Although the problem is, broadly speaking, ideological in nature, the real questions at issue were specific: What Communist leaders in the satellites were mutually acceptable to Moscow and to Tito? During the forthcoming visits of satellite Communist delegations to Belgrade, would Tito agree not to encourage further steps toward independence from the Soviet Union?
- b. The related problem of how far the non-orbit Parties could go in interpreting the "equality" clause of the Moscow Declaration was probably on the agenda. Again, the practical question was whether the Yugoslavs would encourage non-orbit Parties, particularly the Italian Party, toward independence of Moscow, or whether he would agree to restrain such tendencies.
- c. The length of the meetings indicates that a number of other topics may have been discussed. Various sources have suggested that these topics included the Suez crisis; withdrawal of Soviet troops from some of the satellites; Soviet economic aid to Yugoslavia; Soviet economic relations with the satellites; Yugoslav economic ties with the US; and the reestablishment in some guise of the Cominform. We have no reliable information whatever on which, if any, of these subjects were discussed.

3. Possible grounds for negotiation.

There is some evidence that the Yugoslavs agree with the Soviets that liberalization has gone too far too

fast in Poland and possibly Hungary. The signs include the shocked reaction of the Yugoslav Party press to the Poznan riots, and indications that the Yugoslavs are uneasy over the revolt of intellectuals in Hungary. Apparent factionalism within the Communist Parties of Poland and Hungary may have convinced Tito that the Communist structure in the satellites may be endangered by uncontrolled liberalization. A weakening of the Communist bloc in this respect would jeopardize Tito's advantageous balance-of-power position between East and West.

4. Probable limitations on any agreement.
 - a. It is possible that Tito will agree to discourage liberalization in the satellites temporarily, until such time as he believes stable, "de-Stalinized" Communist regimes have been established which may safely resume the movement for independence from Moscow.
 - b. There is no reason to believe that Tito has changed his concept that Yugoslav national security depends on a concept of independent Communist regimes as a balance against pressures either from the West or from the Soviet Union. These views cannot be acceptable to Moscow. Therefore, fundamental problems in Yugoslav-Soviet relations, as well as fundamental problems in the development of international Communism, will remain unresolved by the Tito-Khrushchev talks.

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APPENDIX A
THE YALTA TALKS

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THE YALTA TALKS

After eight days of discussion between Tito and Khrushchev in Yugoslavia starting on 27 September, the two leaders suddenly and unexpectedly flew to Yalta to continue their conference. Tito returned on 5 October, after precisely eight days in the USSR. The Yugoslav party included Rankovic, generally regarded as one of the two possible successors to Tito; Pucar, top Communist in Bosnia Hercegovina; and Tito's wife. Firyubin, Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, accompanied the leaders to the USSR. Soviet Party members identified as present were: Soviet Union President Voroshilov; Central Committee members Kirichenko and Furtseva; Serov, secret police chief; and other lesser lights. Bulganin and Shepilov joined the group shortly after its arrival as did Hungarian Party boss Gero. Shepilov left before the end of the conference to attend the UN session on the Suez. Furtseva returned to Moscow also before the end of the discussions. A TASS report of 29 September said that Central Committee Presidium (Politburo) members Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin, and Saburov were in Moscow at an exhibition on 29 September. As far as is known they did not go to Yalta at any time. Various sources speculate that some of this latter group are members of a Stalinist opposition to Khrushchev.

Early and widespread newspaper speculation that Party relations and ideological differences between Yugoslavia and the USSR were the reasons for Tito's departure was publicly confirmed in a press conference held on 29 September by Branko Draskovic, official spokesman for the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat. He acknowledged the existence of such "differences" but emphasized that the conversations and visits were a "normal" procedure. He also admitted that a CPSU letter to the satellites discussing Yugoslavia "appeared" to exist, but avowed that the Yugoslavs had no copy and did not know the contents. In any case, he considered such a letter also as "normal" procedure. Subsequently Moscow and Belgrade propaganda emphasized the friendly relations persisting between the two countries and that progress was being made. Communist sources have consistently suggested that no formal communique will be issued because of the informal nature of the conversations. Such is the extent of the publicly reported and incontestable facts.

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In explanation of Khrushchev's trip to Yugoslavia, it can be suggested that he had a number of problems to discuss in which Yugoslavia's policy and influence were central: the application and effects of the Moscow Declaration, the direction and effects of satellite liberalization, and possibly even polycentrism. He also may have felt it necessary to explain the Soviet side in the worsening of relations with Yugoslavia and to try to restore harmony, if not complete unity of action.

Why did Tito choose this juncture for discussion with Khrushchev when he knew the meeting would arouse US suspicions and possibly result in termination of US aid? It was not an easy decision, as the apparent controversy it aroused among his advisors testifies. But the issues, and Khrushchev's presentation of them, were grave enough to warrant immediate consultations. Considerations of Communist protocol and propriety were added factors. Refusal to reciprocate would have been a severe affront to Khrushchev. Tito's known vanity must also have been flattered that he should be considered the key to so many problems, and this personal factor may have prompted him to ignore his advisors and meet with Khrushchev. As for his relations with the US, Tito may have calculated that Washington would estimate that he had not given up his independence, upon which US aid has in the last analysis been predicated.

While the theory of a split in the Presidium would certainly be the "overriding" consideration Koca Popovic gave as the reason for Tito's trip, there are several weaknesses in the theory. First of all, evidence of fundamental policy disagreements is lacking. In the second place, if Khrushchev were asking Tito's help against opposition Stalinists, presumably he would have to meet them, but it is a fact that every Presidium member who could be supposed to be a Stalinist was in Moscow, not at Yalta. If one considers Bulganin, who was at Yalta, as a Stalinist, it must be remembered that he has been prominently associated with all of Khrushchev's policies. And even if Tito did confront the Stalinists, it is hard to see how he, as their supposed enemy, could help to persuade them of the virtue of his and Khrushchev's policies. Alternatively, he might agree to give them up, but this would be tantamount to sacrificing all of his independence or freedom of action.

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Finally, responsible observers feel that if there has been a change in basic Soviet policies, then all, including Khrushchev, have agreed to the change.

Yugoslavs had admitted publicly that ideological questions, and privately that ideological disagreements were an issue in the conversations. As we have seen, there is ample evidence to accept this general explanation, if we subsume under the "ideological" heading all the power relationships actually at issue.

As to Khrushchev, he may well have come to explain what was meant by the 3 September directive and the condemnation of "national Communism." He probably argued along the following lines: The Declarations and the shock of his anti-Stalin speech had caused undesirable repercussions. The Poznan riots, the organized intra-Party dissension in Poland and Hungary, and the unhealthy criticism were dangerous signs of collapse or fundamental instability of the Communist structure in Eastern Europe, dangerous to Yugoslavia as well, against which a warning had to be issued. However, the directive was meant to warn only against emulating Tito's ideological independence of the Soviet Union and his economic ties with the West. It did not mean (and this cause for misunderstanding in the warning could be rectified) that satellites should not emulate Yugoslavia's internal structure or that Stalinists of whom Tito did not approve could not be removed or severely chastized, at appropriate times. Thus Khrushchev could persuade Tito that his model and influence could persist, short of national or ideological independence of the Soviet Union.

Another matter presumably weighing on Khrushchev's mind was the repercussions of his anti-Stalin speech in Western Communist Parties, the most important of which was the Italian Communist Party. Togliatti had placed great emphasis on the part of the Moscow Declaration regarding equality of Parties, and polycentrism means that the strategy of Communist Parties does not derive from one center, Moscow, but can be independently plotted. The centers already acknowledged by Moscow, besides the CPSU, are Yugoslavia and China. Khrushchev could argue that the time is not ripe for complete and widespread independence for Communist Parties, nor are all Parties mature enough (as the Yugoslav and Chinese Parties are, as evidenced by their stability).

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Independence on all sides would mean anarchy and could be damaging to their common Marxist-Leninist cause of socialism and the end of capitalism in the world. Guidance from Moscow (with advice from Yugoslavia) is needed. The attractiveness to Tito of such an argument is obvious. He could conceivably compromise, if necessary only temporarily, a doctrinal insistence on the literal implementation of the Moscow Declaration. After all, his "equality" is not threatened. How deep his ideals of democracy among Communists and brotherly concern for other Parties would seem to require little speculation. On the other hand, freedom from Soviet domination for stronger Communist Parties like the Italian CP, would be added insurance to Tito against the recurrence of coordinated pressure against him. It seems doubtful that Khrushchev's appeal would prevail against this consideration.

The possibility that Khrushchev may have attempted to win Tito over to responsiveness to Moscow direction in a new, informal or formal Communist International or Cominform is a speculation with little merit. Given even Khrushchev's insensitivity and his continued confidence that Tito is a staunch Marxist-Leninist at heart, it seems unlikely that he could have suggested it. Even an international "collective leadership" would mean restriction of Tito's prized independence. Any suggestion of his joining such an organization would finish his prospects with the West, and Tito's publicly stated position categorically rejects even an informal, loose association. Insofar as Tito may harbor ambitions in the satellites, he would probably prefer to exercise his influence bilaterally since he could hardly hope to dominate an international Communist organization in the face of Soviet participation and in view of the uncertain reception Yugoslav leadership would receive among satellite leaders.

Some British observers make a strong case for the possibility that Khrushchev would like some form of international control organization, because bilateral controls, allegedly, have proved inadequate. They believe, and it is entirely plausible, that Khrushchev came to seek Tito's advance approval of such an organization, without Tito's necessarily joining it. This issue should be one on which the two men would be least likely to see eye to eye. The furthest that Tito could go in establishing some form of unity of action and unanimity of ideas with the Soviets, short of a Communist international, would appear to be

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to acquiesce temporarily in Khrushchev's proposals on restricting his liberalization aims concerning independence, and Party ferment and possibly concerning polycentrism.

While Gero's presence in Yalta suggests that the Hungarian situation was under discussion, policy toward Hungary would presumably be determined on the basis of conclusions on the more fundamental questions. Gero was reportedly vacationing in the Soviet Union even before Khrushchev left for Yugoslavia.

It has been suggested that the talks concerning one or more of several other topics, including the Suez crisis, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from some of the satellites, Soviet economic aid to Yugoslavia, Soviet economic relations with the satellites, or Yugoslav economic ties with the US. Appropriate representatives for detailed discussion of such matters were absent on both sides. It would seem that any of these topics on the agenda was also incidental to the central problem of the relation of Yugoslav security to liberalization in the satellites.

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APPENDIX B
EVOLUTION OF YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS

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Yugoslav-Soviet relations before the present mutual visits can be described in three phases: the Khrushchev-Bulganin initial visit to Yugoslavia in May and June 1955; the Tito visit to Moscow a year later; and the period of apparent deterioration in the late summer and fall of 1956.

The first visit succeeded in restoring amicable relations on a government level, though it seems evident that Khrushchev came to Belgrade confident that he could presume on Tito's ideological solidarity and thus make a strong bid for restoring Party relations. Tito refused, partly because of the impact such a move would have on the West, but more likely because his own views of Marxism-Leninism had evolved to a point far removed from the Soviet view. While many points of ideological difference might be cited, the governing difference was Tito's awareness and fear that Soviet Marxism-Leninism continued to be territorially imperialistic and ideologically monolithic. This meant to Tito the jeopardy of Yugoslav national sovereignty and reversion to satellite status, with economic dependence and subordination to the Soviet Union and resubjection to the sole authority of Moscow in devising the strategy of achieving their mutual objective of socialism for the world. The Belgrade Declaration of 2 June 1955, mutually acknowledging the validity of the concept that each country may pursue its own road to socialism, was a major achievement for Tito in terms of prestige in that it vindicated his break with Moscow in 1948 and his internal policies. More important, it made Yugoslavia a permissible model for the satellites to emulate. Depending on how and to what extent they did so, such emulation might succeed in attenuating the dangers of future pressure on Yugoslavia from a coordinated Soviet-led bloc.

For Moscow the rapprochement was also an achievement in the context of their general foreign policy aims and in the expectation of future cooperation from Yugoslavia. It should be pointed out too, that the Kremlin leaders had a precedent for recognizing "different roads to socialism." Stalin had refused to recognize Chinese Communist insistence on the concept of China as a model for

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revolutionary seizure and exercise power as expressed in the Chinese slogan "Mao's road." The practical consequences of this doctrinal conflict had been a long-standing irritant in Sino-Soviet relations. The post-Stalin leaders very early conceded the distinctiveness of "Mao's road" without ill consequences, and may have had no serious reason to expect that undesirable repercussions would follow a similar recognition of the Yugoslav "road."

Moscow's validation of separate roads to socialism set the stage for the second phase of post-Stalin relations with Yugoslavia. Party relations were reestablished in the 20 June 1956 Moscow Declaration. To the Yugoslavs this signified a binding commitment by the Soviets to approve not only separate roads to socialism for various countries, but "equality" (i.e. independence) for Communist Parties. Moscow's gain was the virtual unanimity of foreign policy aims voiced in the accompanying Moscow Joint Statement of the governments. While the two statements might seem to signify that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had been brought closer together, it does not appear that Yugoslav ideological independence or national sovereignty were jeopardized by the statements.

To the contrary, there is some reason to believe that Khrushchev may have had second thoughts about the wisdom of these "treaties" with Yugoslavia and about his persistent assumption that Tito was a Marxist-Leninist in the same sense that the Soviets are. Soviet Marxism-Leninism requires that only Communist Parties subservient and loyal to Moscow can achieve socialism. The Yugoslavs have a broader interpretation, claiming that Communist Parties independent of Moscow, and even Socialist parties can achieve socialism. The Moscow Declaration establishing relations on a Marxist-Leninist basis thus had different meanings to the two leaders. Unforeseen repercussions partly attributable to this difference seem to have compelled the Kremlin to modify the commitments of the Moscow Declaration.

Certain signs in the third phase of Soviet-Yugoslav relations tend to confirm the existence of misunderstanding between the two parties. The publication of Khrushchev's secret speech seems to have raised genuine questioning by Western Communists as to the worthiness of the Soviet system as a model to emulate or even to obey. Togliatti's questions on degeneration of the Soviet system and his concept

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of "polycentrism" were sentiments very similar to Tito's own. Moscow was impelled to answer these questions by issuing the Central Committee resolution of 30 June condemning Togliatti's degeneration notion and in effect reasserting Moscow's claim to international Communist leadership. While the resolution merely implies disavowal of models other than the Soviet, a secret directive of the Central Committee of 3 September warned the satellites against emulating Yugoslav communism, and belatedly and with justice acknowledged that Tito was not a Marxist-Leninist (in the Soviet sense), but merely a leftist. A Pravda article of 16 July condemned "national Communism." Bulganin's praise of Tito as a Marxist-Leninist is said also to have been premature. To Tito, these Soviet statements were nothing less than recantations and reversals of commitments made in the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations.

Minor signs of disagreement and irritation between the Soviets and Yugoslavs are afforded by the reaction to the Poznan riots. The Yugoslavs eventually agreed with the Polish explanation of the cause of the riots, but Bulganin in his visit to Poland in July persisted in the foreign provocation line (as did the 30 June resolution), and further condemned the lengths to which public criticism of various kinds had gone to Poland. This seems to have been taken by the Yugoslavs as interference with views and liberalization programs of which they now approved.

Yugoslavia's trial and punishment of returned native Cominformists who had conducted anti-Yugoslav propaganda during the Soviet-Yugoslav cold war prompted a propaganda volley in Soviet and Yugoslav newspapers. While it is safe to assume that the Soviets were not sentimentally moved by the fate of these earlier supporters of the Soviet Union, the fact that the Yugoslavs should have shown no regard for their possible sensitivities may have been an irritant. The Yugoslavs for their own part could take this as unwarranted interference in their internal affairs and a sign of the persistence of the Soviet desire to dominate international Communism.

It was against this background of real and potential disagreement that Khrushchev and Tito undertook to exchange visits between 27 September and 12 October.

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APPENDIX C

YUGOSLAV VIEWS ON SATELLITE DEVELOPMENTS

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YUGOSLAV VIEWS ON SATELLITE DEVELOPMENTS

There seems little question that liberalization in Poland and Hungary has pushed in some respects beyond the limits acceptable to the satellite Communist leaders, posing for them the difficult problem of asserting control without reverting to Stalinist repression. These undesirable aspects of liberalization should be a matter of serious concern to the Kremlin. Whether Khrushchev can persuade Tito that he too should be concerned about them is the important question. An answer requires an examination of the peculiarities of liberalization in Yugoslavia as compared to Poland and Hungary, Yugoslav negative reactions to satellite liberalization developments, and the Yugoslav view of what promotes its national interest and security.

Yugoslavia's liberalization is distinguished from that of the satellites by three elements: economic decentralization and worker management of industry, reformed electoral laws (including multiple candidacies), and a conception of the Party's role which has resulted in restraints on the arbitrariness of local Party bosses. It is important to recognize that even these distinctive reforms have little possibility of changing the essence of the Communist regime. The emancipation of the economy from direct central control, for example, represents no threat to the Tito regime because local Communists or sympathizers hold every key position in worker management. Similarly, Tito's democratic reforms do not permit a political opposition, not even a "loyal opposition" within the Party, as the Djilas incident proves.

We may safely assume that Tito approves and encourages in the satellites the strictly limited kind of liberalization he has permitted in Yugoslavia. That Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and even the Soviet Union itself have taken serious steps toward economic and administrative decentralization is a fact which must flatter Tito's vanity and which he can take as vindication of his form of Marxism-Leninism.

It is obvious too that Tito has encouraged the satellites to get rid of "Stalinists" like Rakosi and would be happy to see the downfall of others like Ulbricht, Hoxha, and Chervenkov (who, though demoted, still appears to Tito to wield undue power), and perhaps even Gero.

However, it cannot be automatically assumed that Tito favors developments which would seriously threaten the stability of the satellite regimes, and the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, there is some evidence that the Yugoslav dictator may be uneasy about recent events in Poland and Hungary insofar as they indicate the existence of individual and organized political opposition.

While the unrest in the other satellites has been well controlled by the Communist leaders, liberalization in Poland and Hungary has been accompanied by opposition acts and criticism which go far beyond what is permissible in Yugoslavia. Liberalization has helped to stimulate the Poznan riots, criticism of a kind and pervasiveness clearly undesirable from the standpoint of the Communist leadership, and the opposition to the Politburo within the Party group known as the Central Party Aktiv (Centralny Aktyw Partyjny - CAF). In Hungary, the activities of the Petofi Youth Circle and the Hungarian Writers' Union have caused serious trouble for the regime.

The Poznan riots may be traceable to the general atmosphere created by liberalization (apart from the severe economic conditions which surely are not unprecedented in Poland). It may be more than a coincidence that the June 1953 riots in East Germany took place in the more or less liberal atmosphere under the "New Course." The initial reaction on how to handle the riots is indicated by the invocation of foreign saboteurs, an allegation which would constitute advance justification for any extremes of repression that the leadership might feel it necessary to exert. Once the Polish leadership were assured that no country-wide uprising was in prospect, they returned to the liberalization rationale by dropping the foreign interference charges and attributing the riots to internal causes. The conduct of the Poznan trials suggests that the riots and this aftermath have not, in the minds of the hard core leadership, endangered the Communist system.

In the Sejm (Parliament) last September, deputies for the first time directed sharp criticism at the policies of the executive arm composed of leading Party members, openly demanded a role in fundamental decisions (such as economic planning), and refused to pass into law a minor decree of the executive. In the spring session of 1956, five Catholic deputies voted against a law on abortion. In spite of this

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startling and unprecedented criticism, scrutiny of the reported Sejm proceedings permits no inference regarding a collaborative opposition effort among the deputies.

We cannot similarly dismiss the public criticism in Poland which, starting with the famous Wazych "Poem for Adults," has continued among writers and in newspapers (particularly the youth paper Po Prostu). This criticism is unprecedented in its depth and direction and important in that it exceeded the limits defined by the top Communist leaders. Eloquent expression of scarcely disguised disenchantment with the Polish Communist regime have been published, along with criticism of the Soviet system.

It is incorrect to assume that all such criticism is "planted" by the regime. We have creditable covert reports on shake-ups in the editorial staffs of leading newspapers and journals. There is good evidence that editors have resisted the demands and reprimands of Politburo members occasioned by their overstepping the bounds of acceptable criticism. Although we cannot state with assurance that newspaper criticism emanates from a unified opposition bloc, it may well be a matter of complicity among Communist intellectuals.

Our reports about the CAP, on the other hand, indicate that it undoubtedly represents a degree of organized opposition disturbing to the Communist leadership. According to these reports, the CAP, which originated in 1954, consists of 150-200 Party intelligentsia, including journalists, in high though not top-ranking positions. The CAP meets from time to time either as a body or in small groups to discuss ideological and policy problems. A real conflict of views has persisted between the CAP and the Politburo, centering primarily on the CAP's demand for a democratization of the Party. The dismissal of Radkiewicz, Minister of Public Security, is authoritatively attributed to the influence of the CAP.

In Hungary, the Petofi Youth Circle and the Hungarian Writers Union represent an organized writers' and intellectuals' revolt marked by unbridled criticism demanding freedom of expression and of creative activity. The Circle's political criticism, more violent than that of the Polish CAP, has included a direct demand for Rakosi's resignation, a demand which may well have influenced his departure from the top Party post.

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The chief danger in such organized Party opposition is the growth of factionalism which might seriously undermine the stability of the regime. It is this danger which may possibly concern Tito as well as the Soviet and satellite leaders.

Some of the Tito regime's reactions to developments in the satellites tend to support this view. It is noteworthy that the official Yugoslav view of the Poznan riots was initially identical to that of the Soviet and Polish regimes. The Party press in Yugoslavia registered the strongest possible disapproval of the riots by inveighing against "foreign interference." This may have expressed the Yugoslav leaders' own deep-seated fear of popular revolt. It was only some weeks afterward that they accepted the later Polish view of the Poznan riots, presumably for the same reasons the Poles changed their line.

The Yugoslav reaction to the opposition vote of five Catholic deputies on the abortion measure is even more revealing in that the Yugoslavs actually saw in this relatively unimportant event the horrifying spectre of an organized opposition in Poland. Yugoslav propaganda has shown a similar uneasiness over the revolt of intellectuals in Hungary. These are some of the signs that suggest fear among Yugoslavs that liberalization in the satellites is going too far too fast. Yugoslav Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Pricea acknowledged this concern, just before Tito went to Yalta.

One might conclude from these reactions that the Yugoslavs are doubtful about encouraging those steps toward liberalization which tend to jeopardize the Communist structure in the satellites. Intra-Party revolts may be one result of liberalization about which Tito has misgivings--misgivings which would provide Khrushchev with an acceptable point of departure for discussion in the recent talks. We may also question whether the Yugoslavs really want the satellites to emulate Tito's independence of the Soviet Union at this time. Yugoslav hesitation in these two respects would be related to their concept of national security.

This is not to suggest that Tito has abandoned his long-range goal of independence for the satellites. The suggestion, rather, is that Tito may be prepared, as a tactical move, to support Khrushchev in controlling satellite liberalization until such time as stable, de-Stalinized regimes are established in the satellites.

Yugoslav concepts of national security and national interest may be expressed as follows. Like the Soviets, the Yugoslav leaders are avowed Marxist-Leninists who view capitalism as a moribund method of organizing society and "socialism" as the inevitable pattern of the future. Where the Soviet leaders insist that socialist power can be achieved only by Communist Parties directed and materially supported by Moscow, the Yugoslavs believe that socialism can be attained by Communists independent of the Soviet Union or by socialists of the West European type, as in Sweden. The inevitable coming-to-power of socialists and Communists will automatically remove the capitalist threat to the Yugoslav Communist regime; the independence of these socialist and Communist regimes from Moscow will remove the constant threat of Soviet domination. Yugoslav foreign policy is ultimately directed toward these two ends. That policy envisions the continuance of Communist regimes in the satellites, without Stalinists and without subjection to Moscow; encourages independence of some, if not all, extra-orbit Communist Parties and their drives to power; and approves Social Democratic parties already in power outside the orbit.

For the present, however, Tito must view the immediate Yugoslav national interest in terms of the balance of power between East and West. The Tito regime's present secure internal position and profitable international position between East and West may be regarded as depending on the continued balance of power between the two blocs. A weakening of the West relative to the Soviet bloc would lay Tito open to renewed Soviet control. A relative weakening of Soviet power would restrict the Tito regime's freedom of action internationally and, by making it more dependent on the alien West, would ultimately threaten his unpopular dictatorship over the Yugoslav people.

Thus Tito's aim of independence for the satellites may be modified by his view of what the consequences would be for the strength of the Soviet bloc. If he calculates that independence now for the satellites would threaten the Communist structure there, he would conceivably agree with Khrushchev's desire to restrict the independence drive. Tito may believe that the satellite leaders are not capable of controlling liberalization as efficiently as he did and that the liberalization momentum may destroy the Communist

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system. On the other hand, if Tito believes that satellite Communist leaders can preserve the one-Party system, he would refuse to accommodate Khrushchev.

Similarly Tito could have an ambivalent attitude toward intra-Party revolts and criticism of Marxism and the Communist system in the satellites. Criticism and factionalism gauged by Tito to endanger the Communist structure in the satellites would seem to be an aspect of liberalization that Tito, like the Soviets, would wish to discourage. However, Tito would have to weigh this danger against the desirability of factionalism directed against Stalinist satellite leaders who derive their policies from Moscow.

Any agreements made by Tito and Khrushchev would not preclude the continued emulation of the Yugoslav "liberalized" internal structure. It is this aspect of the Yugoslav "road" that visiting satellite delegations have regularly acclaimed as a model for their own countries. Neither would suspension of some of Tito's aims in the satellites preclude mutual agreement to purge satellite Stalinists, though hard bargaining would seem to be the prospect, the one mutually agreed condition being that the purges should not lead to undue instability of the Communist regimes.

In all these speculations Tito's vanity and sense of prestige is an imponderable that should not be ignored, but it is safer to assume that they will not blind him to the realistic requirements of his domestic and international position.

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APPENDIX D

ORIGINS AND RATIONALE OF LIBERALIZATION

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"Liberalization" of the Communist regimes in Yugoslavia, the USSR and the satellites was initiated in each case after emancipation from Stalin's influence. In each case the essential objectives were to restore Party morale by ending the arbitrary and ruthless treatment of loyal Party members; to kindle enthusiasm for the regime's political and economic objectives among a population made apathetic or fearful by unnecessary repression; and to achieve a more flexible foreign policy than was possible under Stalin's rigid domination.

Yugoslavia's break with Stalin in 1948 reflected Tito's determination to pursue these objectives. Once assured that his domestic power position was solid, Tito took steps to relax unnecessary controls and to stimulate Party zeal and worker incentives. These liberalized policies were designed also to contrast with the Soviet "distortion of Marxism-Leninism." Finally, since economic salvation and defense against the now-threatening Soviet orbit rested on support from the Free World, some of Tito's reforms were cast with an eye to Western, and particularly US, sensibilities.

In the Soviet Union, analogous measures were taken following the death of Stalin in 1953. Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin, and the dramatic events that followed, marked the culmination rather than the beginning of the new policies. Within a month after the dictator's death, "collective leadership" had been established to prevent a recurrence of his tyranny over the Party, including its leaders. Apart from self-preservation, Stalin's successors in the Politburo had good reason to end the long terror. Khrushchev's picture of Party demoralization under Stalin can be taken at face value. Steps were needed and were taken to restore the vitality of "the vanguard of the proletariat," and to mobilize an apathetic population to active support of the leadership's economic and political policies. Accordingly a checkrein was placed on the secret police, and the Stalinist symbol of its terror, Beria, was eliminated; the system of forced labor was eased, and many of its victims amnestied; "socialist legality" was emphasized; and a measure of freedom was given to intellectual and artistic expression.

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As in Yugoslavia the "humanizing" of Communism was intended also to have a useful impact on the outside world. The image of military imperialism and ruthless domestic oppression was to be replaced by a new look of respectability and by a foreign policy which consistently renounced the use of military force and sought business-like economic agreements with "no strings attached." The Iron Curtain was discreetly lowered to make this friendly image more visible.

In the satellites, similar liberalization policies were initiated by the leadership, either under Soviet pressure or in voluntary emulation of the USSR.

To see the liberalization of the Soviet orbit in perspective, however, it is important to understand what it does not mean. The Communist leaders have consistently denied that their reforms are intended to lead to "bourgeois" democratic practices. No liberalization measure is intended to jeopardize the continuance of the Communist one-Party system or of Party control by its leaders. The maintenance of Party primacy and of Party control from the top, axiomatic in the Party's history since 1903, has been publicly reaffirmed throughout the current liberalization.

Accordingly, recent "reforms" have not been allowed to threaten Party structure or the primacy of Party leadership. The secret police apparatus is still intact, though not so obtrusive as formerly. "Socialist legality" evidently does not extend to "political" crimes involving subversion or disloyalty. Unrestricted contact with Westerners is slight (except in Yugoslavia), and access to Western publications carefully controlled. Criticism of Party leaders, of basic Party decisions, and of the "socialist" system has been effectively curbed, except in Poland and Hungary. We believe that developments in these two satellites, where liberalization has caused Soviet apprehension, were central issues of the Tito-Khrushchev discussions.